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HELLER AS HUBRIS, AND HOW MCDONALD v.
CITY OF CHICAGO MAY WELL CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD AS WE KNOW IT
William G. Merkel*
I. INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court prognostication is famously tricky
business. As would-be landmark cases loom on the horizon,
doctrinal revolutions are sometimes imagined into existence
by the most informed Supreme Court watchers, only to fail
to materialize once the Justices speak and their opinions
are published. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey and Dickerson v. United States come
readily to mind as the most famous recent instances of
constitutional revolutions that never were.1 But District of
Columbia v. Heller,2 in which the Supreme Court, for the first
time, announced that the Second Amendment protected a
right to weapons possession unconnected to service in the
lawfully established militia, did not disappoint those who
*Associate Professor of Law, Washburn Law School. J.D. Columbia, D. Phil.
(history) University of Oxford. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at
the Southeastern Association of Law Schools annual meeting in Palm Beach
and at the Central States Law Schools Association annual meeting in
Columbus. I also had the opportunity to develop the ideas advanced here in the
context of a debate with Professor Ray Diamond during the Dorothy L.
Thompson Civil Rights Lecture on Constitution Day, 2009 at Kansas State
University and as a University Lecture as a Visiting Associate Professor of Law
at the University of North Dakota during the Fall 2009 term. Special thanks to
Professor Diamond, Professor Eric Johnson, and David Kopel for their probing
questions. Thanks also to Professor Saul Cornell for expert guidance. Nancy
Gray and Creighton Miller of the Washburn Law Library and Jan Stone of the
Thormodsgaard Law Library at the University of North Dakota provided
invaluable research assistance. My research assistants at Washburn, Brian
Lindquist and ReAnne Utemark, did excellent work.
1. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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anticipated momentous doctrinal change. Heller was not, as
Cass Sunstein 3 and others4 would have it, an act of humility
on the part of Justice Scalia, or a case of judicial minimalism.
Indeed, claims by some gun rights enthusiasts that Heller did
not change, or expand beyond recognition, the doctrine
proclaimed sixty years ago in United States v. Miller5 are
hard to accept at face value, given that under Miller, it was
all but impossible to plead that arms possession of any sort
merited judicially enforceable constitutional protection.6
Heller changed the constitutional landscape boldly and
significantly. The majority decision and the opinion that
supports it were, in my view, acts of hubris, and the right
they created-I do not say recognized-threatens to become
absolutist rather than limited in its application once it is
incorporated against the states as it almost certainly will be
in McDonald v. City of Chicago. Notwithstanding Justice
Scalia's famous disclaimers in Heller, which were perhaps
inserted solely to bring Justice Kennedy on board to create a
3. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as
Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008).
4. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller:
Speculations About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (2009);
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, ILL. PUB.
L. & LEGAL RES. PAPER SERIES, FEB. 9, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid-1241655.
5. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
6. Justice Scalia endorses this claim in Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813-16,
maintaining that the Miller Court's decision to deny Second Amendment
protection to an unregistered short-barrel shotgun depended on that weapon's
lack of any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of well
regulated militia, rather than the fact that the two individuals possessing the
weapon were neither doing militia duty nor active members of the militia.
Thus, for Justice Scalia, Miller was entirely consistent with affording Second
Amendment protection to weapons not actually used in militia service. Because
he believed Miller had been misapplied by the numerous federal appellate
courts that had uniformly rejected Second Amendment challenges over the
seven decades prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Parker v. District of
Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (2007), it was therefore not necessary for Justice Scalia
to overturn Miller in order to uphold the D.C. Circuit's decision in Parker by
holding in favor of Heller and against the District of Columbia. In dissent,
Justice Stevens vigorously disagreed respecting the meaning of Miller, Heller at
2844-46. Justice Scalia's argument that Miller is consistent with constitutional
protection for weapons not used in militia service and held by persons not
serving in the militia echoes the claims of commentators such as Nelson Lund,
The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right Self Preservation, 39
ALA. L. REV. 103, 109 (1987), and Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds,
Telling Miller's Tale: A Reply to David Yassky, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
2002, at 113, 114 (2002).
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majority, the case is likely to spawn progeny that
substantially undermines the gun control and anti-crime
policies now embraced by the democratically elected
legislatures and councils of numerous urban and suburban
jurisdictions throughout the land.7 This process will begin
when McDonald is decided, likely on the last day of the 2010
term.
Writing for a 5-4 Court over strongly worded and
passionate dissents by Justices Breyer and Stevens, Justice
Scalia claimed to rely on originalism of the original public
meaning stripe as he read a private right to arms into the
Second Amendment.' His alleged reliance on originalism
paid homage-in name, if not in fact-to the celebrated faith
in neutral principles of judging that he most famously
articulated in his 1997 manifesto, A Matter of Interpretation.9
There, he embraced the position that by cleaving to the
original public meaning of constitutional text, judges could
review and invalidate legislative and executive acts at odds
with constitutional precepts based on a wholly objective
standard that did not require, in Alexander Hamilton's
famous phrase from The Federalist No. 78, substituting will
for judgment.' Some commentators" and a very small
7. According to Justice Scalia:
Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. We also recognize
another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms.
Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected
were those "in common use at the time." We think that limitation is
fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of
"dangerous and unusual weapons."
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (citations omitted). On Justice Kennedy's posture
in Heller (reflected in his comments during oral argument), see William G.
Merkel, The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia's Perverse Sense
of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 349, 364-65 (2009).
8. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.
9. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
10. Justice Scalia explained his rejection of original intent in favor of
original meaning during a speech at Catholic University the year before he
published A Matter of Interpretation:
The theory of originalism treats a constitution like a statute, and gives
it the meaning that its words were understood to bear at the time they
were promulgated. You will sometimes hear it described as the theory
of original intent. You will never hear me refer to original intent,
2010] 1223
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number of historians 2 have expressed sympathy or even
admiration for original public meaning focused jurisprudence.
Yet the more common practice among historians expert in the
founding and Reconstruction eras is to lampoon the
practitioners of original public meaning jurisprudence as
historically naive, politically calculating, and results
oriented.'3  This has certainly been the case respecting
historians who have commented on Heller, and while Justice
Scalia's opinion has its fans in the gun rights advocacy
because as I say I am first of all a textualist, and secondly an
originalist. If you are a textualist, you don't care about the intent, and
I don't care if the framers of the Constitution had some secret meaning
in mind when they adopted its words. I take the words as they were
promulgated to the people of the United States, and what is the fairly
understood meaning of those words.
Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.: A Theory of Constitution Interpretation (Oct. 18, 1996). On
the difference between intent-focused originalism and original public meaning
focused originalism, see also Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 621 (1999). In The Federalist, Hamilton
wrote:
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretence of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case of
two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every
adjudication upon any single statute. The courts must declare the
sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The
observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to be no
judges distinct from that body.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1888).
11. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 10, at 613; Vasan Kesavan & Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting
History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as
a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006); Keith E. Whittington, The
New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POLY 599 (2004).
12. See, e.g., David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a
Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written
Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009). While
highly critical of Heller's application of history, Konig accepts, at least for the
sake of argument, the legitimacy of original public meaning-focused
constitutional interpretation. See id.
13. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of
History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2008); Jack
N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest State of Originalism, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2001); The New York Times.com,
httpJ/topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/qa-jack-rakove-on-heller-and-history
(June 26, 2008, 18:55 EST).
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community and among libertarian-leaning legal scholars, 14
historians of the founding era have been joined by numerous
other public intellectuals in condemning Heller as an
unprincipled exercise of judicial law-making. 15 Indeed, some
of Heller's strongest critics are conservative judges and jurists
with unimpeachable movement conservative credentials. 6
II. THE HUBRIS OF HELLER
My own objections to Justice Scalia's work product in
Heller focus on the fact that his allegedly history-driven
method depends fundamentally on numerous false historical
claims. According to Justice Scalia and the Heller majority,
the Second Amendment's language about the militia and the
State is prefatory and non-operative while the plain meaning
of the functional text respecting the right to bear arms-as
understood at the time of its creation-is that the
14. See, e.g., Alan Gura, Heller and the Triumph of Originalist Judicial
Engagement: A Response to Judge Harvie Wilkinson, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1127
(2009); Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13.
15. Prominent historians of late-eighteenth-century political thought in the
United States who have criticized Justice Scalia's opinion as results driven
include Jack Rakove and Saul Cornell. See Cornell, supra note 13; The New
York Times.com, supra note 13 (featuring a Q&A with Rakove); see also Merkel,
supra note 7. Over a dozen leading historians of the late eighteenth century
joined an amicus brief in Heller highly critical of the private rights reading of
the Second Amendment. Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove et al. in support
of Petitioners at 9-13, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No.
07-290). The brief was signed by leading eighteenth-century specialists Jack N.
Rakove, Fred Anderson, Carol Berkin, Saul Cornell, Paul Finkelman, R. Don
Higginbotham, Stanley N. Katz, David Konig, Pauline R. Maier, Peter S. Onuf,
Robert E. Shalhope, John Shy, and Alan Taylor, as well as historians whose
work focuses on other periods. See id. David Konig, a highly respected legal
historian with particular expertise in the founding period is willing to take
original public meaning at face value as a philosophy of constitutional
interpretation, but argues that the Scalia opinion disingenuously imports
nineteenth-century concepts into the eighteenth century in order to prop of the
desired reading. Konig, supra note 12. Academics in other disciplines who have
expressed skepticism of the Heller majority opinion include law professors Reva
B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 215--26 (2008), Adam Winkler, Heller's Catch-22, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009), and legal and public policy scholars Philip J. Cook,
Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats and
Sideshows form a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041 (2009).
16. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling
Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of
Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008,
at 32-33 (labeling Justice Scalia's opinion "faux originalism").
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Constitution protects a personal right to carry commonly held
weapons for purposes of confrontation. 17 Having read out of
the equation the pivotal introductory language about the
militia, Justice Scalia and the majority conclude that the core
meaning of the constitutional text is that individuals have the
right to armed self-defense, and that any secondary meaning
related to performing armed service in the militia is trivial
and idiosyncratic.'" These claims depend on haphazard
assumptions rather than historically supportable deductions.
In fact, the surviving historical record demonstrates quite
conclusively that just the opposite of what Justice Scalia
asserts is true. Not only was discussion of the right to bear
arms almost invariably linked to discussion of the virtues of
the militia and the dangers of standing armies in the late
eighteenth century, but the "operative" phrase "bear arms"
carried an overwhelmingly martial meaning when the Second
Amendment was debated and ratified.' 9
As recorded in the Annals of Congress, twelve members
of the House of Representatives spoke when the text that
became the Second Amendment was under consideration in
1789. All discussed militia- and military-related issues,
principally conscientious objection. 20  Not one mentioned
private self-defense, hunting, or gun collecting. Senate
debates were not transcribed until 1794, when the Senate
first opened its proceedings to reporters and the public, but
an electronic search of the Library of Congress database
(containing all extant official records of the Continental and
U.S. Congresses between 1775 and 1791) reveals forty-one
additional uses of the phrase "bear arms" or "bearing arms" in
contexts other than discussion of the proposed Bill of
Rights.22 In all but four instances, the use is unambiguously
military and collective.23
Of course, aficionados of original public meaning have
been known to shrug off damning evidence taken from the
17. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).
18. See id. at 2794.
19. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 778-781, 796 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the




deliberations of legislative or constitution-making bodies 24 on
the grounds that the intent of a collective body is a
mysterious and elusive thing, not well calculated to be clearly
ascertainable, and not likely to map on to the common sense
understandings of the good people out of doors whose act of
ratification gave constitutional text binding authority in the
first place. 25 But when usage in legislative and constitutional
chambers contrasts overwhelmingly with the meaning
espoused by advocates preaching original public meaning,
surely the burden rests on the original public meaning
adherents to show that their preferred understanding-while
inconsistent with that of the text's authors-is nonetheless in
harmony with that of its ratifiers.
The problem for Justice Scalia is that the record
respecting public usage of the phrase "bear arms"
overwhelmingly supports a dominant military meaning just
as clearly as do the records from legislative chambers. As
reported by careful historian Nathan Kozuskanich in the
peer-reviewed and highly respected Journal of the Early
Republic, an electronic search of Charles Evans's American
Bibliography, a comprehensive collection of surviving books
and pamphlets from 1690 to 1800, yields 210 hits for "bearing
arms" and its cognates other than those contained in reprints
of the Bill of Rights and other government papers.26
According to Kozuskanich, 202 of these uses (96.2 percent)
are unambiguously military and collective, not private and
personal.27 The same search on Early American Newspapers,
a database of over 120 American newspapers from 1690 to
1800, yields 143 hits, 140 of which (97.9 percent)
Kozuskanich describes as clearly related to rendering
military service or performing militia duty.28 In ignoring this
record (cited by several amici in Heller), Justice Scalia
elevated what was in the late eighteenth century a decidedly
eccentric and outlying meaning to the summit of
constitutional orthodoxy.
Not only is Justice Scalia's Heller opinion unsupported by
the historical record, it also has been savaged by several
24. See Scalia, supra note 10.
25. See id.
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leading historians of late eighteenth-century American
political thought, including Jack Rakove and Saul Cornell.29
To my knowledge, Justice Scalia's interpretation is considered
historically accurate by only two PhD historians whose
expertise focuses on the late-eighteenth-century United
States: Robert Churchill and James Henretta. ° Granted, at
least two additional prominent Heller enthusiasts, Joyce Lee
Malcolm and Robert Cottrol, hold PhDs in history, but
Malcolm's expertise is in seventeenth-century England and
Cottrol wrote his PhD on black communities in Providence,
Rhode Island in the antebellum period before he embarked on
a law teaching career. 3'
On the other side, a veritable honor roll of prominent
historians of the late-eighteenth-century United States joined
other distinguished scholars in an amicus brief in Heller
highly critical of the private rights reading of the Second
Amendment.32 These historians object to the conclusions
endorsed in the Heller opinion not simply on the grounds that
they are irreconcilable with historical facts, but because they
depend on a disingenuous interpretation of constitutional
language. Indeed, for those who understand that the
meaning of language is historically inflected rather than
suspended out of time, the opinion's linguistic assumptions
and purported conclusions beggar belief.33 Justice Scalia
broke the Second Amendment down into its component parts,
arbitrarily labeled the text that did not comport with his
predilections a "preface," and the part he found more
29. See supra note 11.
30. For informed historical analyses consistent with Justice Scalia's position
(neither one of which takes Kozuskanich's empirical work into account), see
Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep
Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW &
HIST. REV. 139 (2007), and James A. Henretta, Collective Responsibilities,
Private Arms, and State Regulations: Toward the Original Understanding, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 529 (2004).
31. See George Washington University Law School Faculty Homepage for
Robert J. Cottrol, http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/Profile.aspx?id=1721# (last
visited Feb. 11, 2010); George Mason University Law School Homepage for
Joyce Malcolm, http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fultime/malcolm-
joyce (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
32. See supra note 15.
33. See Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History:
"Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss," 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2009);
Konig, supra note 12.
[Vol:501228
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congenial "operative."34 In the process, he relied on mid- and
late-nineteenth-century interpretive conventions that
allegedly downplay the significance of preambles, and ignored
the dominant interpretive paradigms of the late eighteenth
century that accord preambles substantial weight.35 He then
distilled the language he called operative down into its
constituent subparts, and ruled that the essence of the
amendment, the right to bear arms, meant the right to carry
weapons for confrontation in the late-eighteenth-century
United States. He did so even as he ignored the fact that well
over ninety percent of surviving recorded uses from the
colonial and early national period's concern service in the
military or militia as opposed to private uses of weapons.36
Thus, it is not only the counter-factuality of Justice
Scalia's opinion that strikes historians as wrongheaded: from
the perspective of specialists in late-eighteenth-century
American political thought, the most disturbing feature of the
Heller opinion is that it is militantly a-contextual. Deliberate
avoidance of context, in turn, depends on tuning out the
preamble which, when crafted, highlighted the context and
helped crystallize the meaning to late-eighteenth-century
eyes and ears. As a theoretical matter, Justice Scalia abhors
context because it muddies the waters of the fictive world of
objective interpretive simplicity that he finds congenial. 7
According to Justice Scalia, Randy Barnett, and other leaders
of the original public meaning school, neutral interpretation
requires recovering constitutional meanings without recourse
to anything that might inject subjective values into the
process.3  But in the Second Amendment context, this
approach is inherently dishonest to the extent it purports to
be based on fidelity to the understanding of the ratifying
public, precisely because that public chose to ratify the whole
text of the Amendment, not just the part Justice Scalia
arbitrarily classified as significant. Indeed, those who voted
to ratify the language at issue two hundred and twenty years
ago had subjective values, and tried very hard to ensure that
those values were written into the language that presented
34. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2008).
35. See Cornell, supra note 33, at 1106-12; Konig, supra note 12, at 1297.
36. See Cornell, supra note 33; Konig, supra note 12.
37. See Cornell, supra note 33; Konig, supra note 12.
38. See Barnett, supra note 10; Scalia, supra note 10.
20101 1229
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itself for ratification before they allowed themselves to be
satisfied it merited approval.39
As historians of American political thought know all too
well, an enormous amount of scholarly effort has gone into
rediscovering all the nuanced meanings of political discourse
of the revolutionary and founding periods. That effort yielded
what historians call the republican synthesis, and aspects of
the synthesis were absorbed into law schools some twenty
years ago when people like Bruce Ackerman and Cass
Sunstein became intrigued with the concept." But something
was lost in translation. To historians, the anti-army trope
was always at the center of the republican paradigm. To
anyone who spent long years in graduate school reading the
works of J.G.A Pocock, Bernard Bailyn, and pre-1992 Gordon
Wood, 4' there can be no doubt that the Second Amendment's
language signaled to late eighteenth century Americans a
desire to be free of the baneful effects of standing armies that
had absolutely nothing to do with hunting or shooting
burglars.42
It is crucial for Justice Scalia to keep Pocock and
39. On the role of popular politics and opinion in the struggle to create the
Bill of Rights, with a particular emphasis on popular opinion's effect on James
Madison's drafting, see RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS (2006).
40. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Cass
Sunnstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
41. See e.g. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Bernard
Bailyn & Jane N. Garrett eds., 1965); J.G.A POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION (1975); J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS
ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY (6th ed. 1971); THREE BRITISH
REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980); THE VARIETIES OF
BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1500-1800 (J.G.A Pocock, et al. eds., 1993);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787
(1969) [hereinafter WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC];but see
also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: HOW A
REVOLUTION TRANSFORMED A MONARCHICAL SOCIETY INTO A DEMOCRATIC ONE
UNLIKE ANY THAT HAD EVER EXISTED (1992) [hereinafter WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION], in which Wood maintained a
republican outlook respecting the early revolutionary period, but mapped out a
course towards liberal democracy as he discussed the transition from the
revolutionary period to the early republic. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 41; WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, supra note 41.
42. See H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE
RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, How THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002).
1230 [Vol:50
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company out of the picture because once they are on the
scene, Scalia's interpretive gambit and that of private rights
enthusiasts collapses. Hence, Justice Scalia emphasizes that
the task of the judge applying original public meaning
originalism is to interpret text according to its everyday and
ordinary meaning, and not probe into its secret or technical
meanings." But in this instance at least, this process of
reliance on reconstructed simple self-evidence is unfaithful to
original understanding. This is because the language of the
Second Amendment was actually originally understood by the
average, everyday American on the streets or in the fields in
1789-1791 in the anti-army, anti-corruption idiom elucidated
by Pocock and company, as the empirical work of
Kozuskanich makes abundantly clear.' To be sure, Joyce
Appleby, Daniel T. Rogers, James Kloppenberg, T.H. Breen
and others have challenged the ascendancy of the republican
synthesis. 5 But even those who argue that the republican
case was pressed too far acknowledge its power at its core and
question merely its application at the edges, stressing that
there are some things it does not explain. And historians
skeptical of republicanism's explanatory power for the
individualistic Age of Jackson still accept its explanatory
power for the Revolutionary period.46 To the overwhelming
43. As Justice Scalia writes, "normal meaning may of course include an
idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not
have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation." District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008).
44. See Kozuskanich, supra note 22.
45. See JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE
REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790S (1984); T.H. BREEN, THE LOCKEAN MOMENT:
THE LANGUAGES OF RIGHTS ON THE EVE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2001);
James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism,
and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1987);
Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11
(1992).
46. The limits of the liberal reaction to republicanism and the validity of the
core republican insights even under liberal scrutiny are discussed in Isaac
Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787,
45 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1988), and Linda K. Kerber, The Revolutionary
Generation: Ideology, Politics and Culture in the Early Republic, in THE NEW
AMERICAN HISTORY 31-59 (Eric Foner ed., 2d. ed. 1997), which both suggest
that multiple modes of discourse animated American politics in the early
nineteenth century, with republicanism predominating up until a contested
point that falls sometime after ratification of the Bill of Rights. On this point,
see also Konig, supra note 12. I developed my own argument respecting the
survival of republicanism as the dominant paradigm in American political
20101 1231
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majority of professional historians, there remains little doubt
that for non-elites and nascent individualists, as well as
classically trained planters and urban lawyers, language
about militia and bearing arms sounded in terms of civic
virtue and not private rights to hunt or shoot burglars when
the Bill of Rights was debated and ratified.47
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's rhetoric about neutral
principles of judging, to historians of the late eighteenth
century (other than Robert Churchill), Heller is self-evidently
a case of a judicially invented right or, at the very least, a
mid-nineteenth-century right transposed backwards in time
to the late eighteenth century. 48 There is, however, a larger
issue at stake in Heller, and it concerns the legitimacy of
judicial invalidation of legislation-not just on grounds of
violation of a judicially invented private right to weapons
possession, but on any judicially enforced grounds
whatsoever. When Chief Justice Marshall asserted the
authority of law courts to strike down legislation and
executive action in Marbury v. Madison49 and McCulloch v.
Maryland,5" he was at great pains to explain two things: first
that the invalidation amounted (again, in Hamilton's words)
to an act of judgment, not of will, and second, that
invalidating acts of the democratic branches of federal and
state government was not usurpation of the rights of the
peoples' representatives, but rather intervention authorized
by the higher authority of the Constitutional Convention, in
which the people themselves set up a system to delimit the
powers of their legislative and executive agents."' And
perhaps this claim of Marshall's-legitimizing judicial review
by reference to the super-majoritarian authority of the
ratifying conventions-had some validity in 1803. But
Jefferson's famous time-window of nineteen years-the time,
using contemporary demographic data, during which half the
generation of adults who had ratified a Constitution would
pass on-was hard at work. By the time Marshall decided
thought during the ratification period in UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 42, at
248-52.
47. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
48. See Konig, supra note 12.
49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
50. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
51. Id.; Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
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McCulloch, relatively few who had voted to ratify remained,
and by the end of the antebellum years, all had passed.52
It is more than counterintuitive that originalists would
still rely implicitly on the same supermajoritarian rationale
as Marshall to justify judicial review, for the founding
generation's capacity to license agents surely does not escape
the confines of the Rule Against Perpetuities. To invoke a
long-dead principal to veto the acts of agents of the living is
not an appeal to democracy or to popular sovereignty. It is an
appeal to defunct authority. The question of the basis for
judicial review remains analytically distinct from that of
ensuring the neutrality of judicial review, should judicial
review be found appropriate. While Justice Scalia claims that
originalism of the original public meaning stripe can keep
subjective values out of the invalidation process, as far as I
can tell, he has nothing other than vague hints at ancestor
worship (and let's face it, they are not even his ancestors) to
offer to justify recourse to the process at all.
With this analytic ground work laid, let us unpack the
absurdity of Justice Scalia's interpretive claim in Heller in all
of its dimensions. His reasoning, in its express and implicit
dimensions, closely tracks the following schematic:
It is legitimate for the Supreme Court of the United
States to intervene, and by a one-vote majority,
strike down a gun control statute enacted in the
1970s by the democratically elected legislature of the
District of Columbia because:
a. 220 years ago, about 500,000 voters, all of
them long since dead, ratified a Constitution
b. That does not expressly establish judicial
review in the Supreme Court
c. But can be creatively read to do so
d. And was amended within a few years to
52. On Jefferson's theory that constitutions lost their legitimacy once half
the generation that had ratified the instrument passed away, see HERBERT E.
SLOAN, PRINCIPLE AND INTEREST: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF
DEBT 50-85 (1995). Sloan's masterful book draws on many sources, but his
focus is on Jefferson's famous letter to Madison of 6 September 1789, in which
Jefferson explained that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living; the dead
have neither powers nor rights over it." Id. at 50. In the same letter, Jefferson
explained his demographic calculations that yielded the nineteen-year time-
frame for constitutional legitimacy. Id. at 51-53.
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contain language
e. That overwhelmingly, at the time it was used,
signified nothing whatsoever about private self-
defense
f. But as interpreted today by Justice Scalia,
clearly had a principally private self-defense
significance at the time it was ratified.
In a path-breaking article in the Yale Law Journal,3
Jeremy Waldron made several trenchant and controversial
points about judicial review generally, and judicial review in
the United States in particular. As Waldron remarked,
Americans tend to celebrate judicial review as the great
national contribution to political science, and perhaps as a
consequence, they may overestimate its philosophical
significance and-more importantly-fail to realize how
profoundly anti-democratic the device is. 54 This problem is
compounded, in Waldron's eyes, because there is neither an
empirical nor a principled case that judges are better suited
than legislators to take rights seriously and to protect their
exercise by minorities.55 I disagree with Waldron to the
extent that he feels judicial review cannot be justified, but I
agree that the burden is on those who would justify it. 5 6 And,
if originalism is to justify judicial intervention, I would like to
hear a far better explanation of how the supermajority of
1788 trumps the majority of today than that which underlies
Justice Scalia's reasoning.
On the most basic level, conventional justifications for
judicial intervention in the name of originalism make little
53. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115
YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
54. Id. at 1348-49, 1353.
55. Id. at 1349, 1405.
56. My sense is that at least in the extended federal republic, there is
something to be said for judicial intervention as an added bulwark against
abuse of local and regional minorities, for precisely the reasons articulated by
Madison in The Federalist No. 10. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
The more diverse and extended the polity, the less likely it becomes that a
national majority will agree to reduce any particular minority to second class
citizenship. That said, Madison's system celebrated in The Federalist No. 10 is
also rigged against change and in favor of the status quo. Id. In this light in
particular, Waldron's point that it may be merely a function of historical
contingency-rather than the nature of judging-that led the federal judiciary
to take African-American rights more seriously than state legislatures during
the 1950s and 1960s cannot readily be dismissed.
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sense, as aptly illustrated by their application to the Heller
majority opinion: people we never knew, who are long since
dead, made rules to bind us and we must follow them because
they said so. (Of course, as a historical matter, it is anything
but clear that the framers or ratifiers did say we must follow
their rules, but originalists have never been concerned with
historical accuracy.) And, in following the rules they made,
we must interpret the rules exactly as they intended, because
they said so. (Once again, the truth of the matter is that they
did not say so, seeing as the Constitution did not come with
an owner's manual or an interpretive handbook.) And Justice
Scalia is here today to interpret the language exactly as those
people 220 years ago would have interpreted it, because he
says so. (They certainly never said so, for there are no
founding era prophesies that a judge would one day rise to
restore the fallen nation to true constitutional
understanding.) Having established, at least implicitly, this
foundation as a warrant for neutral judging, Justice Scalia
then gets the interpretation patently wrong, embracing a
meaning that was, at best, a fringe outlier when the text was
created. On the whole, it is a farcical exercise.
Fans of originalism or variants of originalism as diverse
as Bruce Ackerman17 and the tandem of John McGinnis and
Michael Rappaport 58 have sometimes argued-on grounds
partly instrumental and partly directed towards legitimizing
constitutional principles by reference to popular
sovereignty-that the Constitution merits greater deference
than simple legislation because the former was ratified by a
supermajority of an animated populace rather than by a
narrow legislative majority acting on behalf of a largely
disengaged electorate. 59 This premise, too, is perhaps more
alluring on casual first impression than on closer inspection.
To be sure, the consent of nine out of thirteen states was
required to bring the Constitution into operation, but the
convention votes in such populous states as Virginia,
Massachusetts, and New York were very close, ratification
57. See ACKERMAN, supra note 40; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
58. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and
Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115 (2007).
59. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 57; ACKERMAN, supra note 40;
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 58.
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failed in North Carolina and Rhode Island, and numerous
groups (comprising an overwhelming majority of the
population) were excluded from the electoral process and
ratification conventions in every state.60 The claim that the
Constitution was ratified by a supermajority of the people is,
therefore, much less clear than the case that it was ratified by
a supermajority of the states.
Assuming originalism-inspired judicial review could
overcome the democratic deficit problem, there arises the
perhaps more fundamental issue of whether the revolutionary
generation possesses any moral authority to govern beyond
the grave. The Constitution of 1787-1788 and the Bill of
Rights of 1789-1791 are at once eloquent and elegant, and
over the course of more than two centuries' use they have
shown themselves eminently workable, but these documents
and the institutions they bequeathed originated in a violent
and in many respects unjustifiable revolution. The
revolutionary generation led a revolt on behalf of a minority
with highly questionable grievances, and in the process,
initiated a war that killed 40,000 and drove 100,000 into
exile. 61 What principles did the war vindicate, and were the
human costs of victory justified by the gravity of the alleged
wrongs the revolutionary Americans sought to overcome?
The Declaration of Independence intones incontrovertible
and compelling precepts of human rights and good
government, but the bill of particulars it recites against the
British government do not appear especially persuasive in the
fullness of time. There are essentially two classes of
60. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 94-160 (1996), for a trenchant analysis of the
ratification process. The role and extent of popular participation is analyzed
cogently in SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 81-157 (1999).
61. On casualty figures for the American Revolution see MICHEAL
CLODFELTER, WARFARE AND ARMED CONFLICTS: A STATISTICAL REFERENCE TO
CASUALTY AND OTHER FIGURES, 1618-1991, at 197-99 (1992), and on total
numbers of loyalist refugees, see 1 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 963-64 (Richard L. Blanco & Paul J. Sanborn eds., 1993), which
estimates that between a fifth and a third of the white population remained
loyal to the Crown and that between eighty and one hundred thousand whites
and blacks fled the thirteen colonies to British-controlled territories during or
immediately after the War. Substantial numbers of additional American
refugees were attracted in the British territory of Lower Canada by government
land bounties during the 1780s and 1790s. 1 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
supra note 61, at 972-74.
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grievances against the King--one consisting of executive
orders to enforce the law against smugglers, tax evaders, and
rioters, and the other of repeated failures to veto
parliamentary legislation deemed undesirable by colonists
who disputed the subject matter jurisdiction of Parliament in
North America. s2 The first class of grievancesthen merely
chides an executive for enforcing the law-perhaps
overzealously, perhaps recklessly-and in the process costing
loss of property and small-scale loss of life. The colonial
response initiated a war that cost more lives by orders of
magnitude, perhaps by several thousand fold. 63 The second
class of complaint, concerning failure to use the negative, is in
large measure fanciful because the power of the Crown to
veto acts of the Westminster Parliament had long lied in
abeyance, and had not been asserted since Queen Anne
vetoed the Scottish Militia Bill of 1708 one year after the
Union.' This larger class of grievance did not, in truth,
concern failure of regal duty, but objection to parliamentary
policy. Yet many of the parliamentary acts deemed
particularly offensive now appear more enlightened than the
colonists' preferred alternatives. These included the "right"
to remove Indians more aggressively than Britain thought
prudent or just, "security" against the exercise of Catholicism
by Quebecois who chose to remain true to the faith and civil
law they had inherited, "freedom" from repealed taxes that
had confiscated a trivial portion of colonial wealth, and the
"duty" of a violent and at times terroristic minority to impose
radical political change on a passive majority. In point of
fact, these are hardly the well springs of binding moral
obligations to descend to the tenth generation and beyond.
To be sure, the fighting done and independence achieved
or imposed, depending on one's perspective, the framers did
62. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); DAvID
ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 54-55
(2007).
63. Cf. CLODFELTER, supra note 61 (noting that five people died in the
"Boston Massacre" and an estimated forty thousand or more died during the
Revolutionary War).
64. See, e.g., JOHN ROBERTSON, THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE
MILITIA ISSUE 6 (1985); J.R. WESTERN, THE ENGLISH MILITIA IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL ISSUE: 1660-1802, at 162
(1965); David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic
Context for the Historical Meaning of "the Right of the People to Keep and Bear
Arms," 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 119, 132 (2004).
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propose, and the public did ratify, a well-conceived and
workable system of constitutional governance in a federal
republic. Mr. Justice Scalia is also quick to laud them for
having the foresight to leave us (their successors in interest)
free to change 65 that system-if we can overcome its deep
barriers of entrenchment and amend by two-thirds majority
in each federal house and with the concurrence of each house
of the legislature in at least thirty-eight states; that is, avoid
veto of the proposed amendment by a coalition that could be
as feeble as a single-vote majority in thirteen of the 101
legislative chambers in the federal republic.16 For this, the
living generation is supposed to be grateful to Mr. Madison?
We can change the rules that govern our lives because a cabal
who lived 220 years ago proposed that we might, and a small
majority of the voting-eligible population, in a then sparsely
populated country embracing less than half the territory, and
one hundredth of the people of the present United States said
we can-but if, and only if, we can achieve majorities in at
least seventy-seven of the 101 legislative chambers in the
current federal republic? For this so-called gift, I will not
thank Mr. Madison or his almost-chosen generation.67 From
the perspective of first principles of democracy and
constitutionalism, it would seem much more legitimate to
assert in pointedly Jeffersonian terms that those now living
could change the rules that govern our lives today if a
substantial majority of voters now living agree to do so. 68
65. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
66. The Constitution states:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall
call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either Case,
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several states,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. V. All states but unicameral Nebraska have two chambers; the
ninety-nine state chambers plus the federal chambers make 101.
67. The reference is to Lincoln's famous description of the flawed American
nation as God's "almost chosen people," which Lincoln employed in his Address
to the Senate of New Jersey on February 21, 1861 during the journey to
Washington for his first inauguration. See generally ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 575 (Roy P. Basler ed., 2001).
68. On Jefferson's theory that the dead cannot bind the living, see SLOAN,
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More concretely, it is not at all clear as a matter of moral duty
that the opinions of people living 220 years ago should have
anything to do with whether the people of the District of
Columbia can decide to ban handguns in our own lifetimes. It
is even less clear that Justice Scalia's patently false gloss on
what people living 220 years ago meant by enacting the
Second Amendment should trump what the democratically
elected government of the District of Columbia clearly and
self-evidently meant when it duly enacted a statute banning
handguns on behalf of an electorate who still favor that
legislative choice over the alternative selected for them by the
Supreme Court.69
III. HOW MCDONALD MAY CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD AS WE KNOW IT
So much for the Heller decision, Justice Scalia's
handiwork, and the generation of '76. What about McDonald
v. City of Chicago and incorporation? And what about
intergenerational fealty owed to those who fought and died
four score and some years after the colonists rebelled? This,
to me, is a decidedly different question, and one that might be
answered in the affirmative without recourse to nationalism
and patriotic fervor to steer ones judgment. On grounds of
human rights and collective responsibility alone it should be
less problematic that the generation that ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment has a greater moral claim on
posterity than the revolutionaries of 1776, who merely
asserted what Harvard history professor David Armitage
calls "settler grievances" against the colonial metropolis.70
Nearly four hundred thousand Union soldiers died during
the Civil War.71 And what did they die for? Not for the right
supra note 52.
69. See D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (1973); see also District of Columbia Mayor's
Office, District Government Reacts to Heller Ruling (June 26, 2008),
httpJwww.dc.gov/mayor/news/release.asp?id=1325&mon=200806; Paul Duggan
& David Nakamura, D.C. Government Faces a New Reality, WASH. POST, June
27, 2008, at A09, available at httpJ/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/06/26/AR2008062603988.html.
70. See ARMITAGE, supra note 62, at 135-36 (describing a historical pattern
of colonial settlers of European descent growing to resent restrictions and
obstacles imposed by the imperial protective power on the exploitation of
aboriginal peoples).
71. Union losses in combat combined with deaths from disease while in
military or naval service or in enemy captivity during the War totaled over
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to be free from Catholicism in Quebec, or easily affordable
taxes on tea, or to obtain unhindered access to Indian lands
beyond the crest of the Appalachians. They fought to save the
Union and, as the Civil War wore on, more and more clearly,
they fought to end slavery.72 The Reconstruction Congress
that assembled when the soldiers' work was done proposed
not only recognition of slavery's end, but also state obligations
to uphold equal protection, due process, and privileges or
immunities as amendments to the Constitution, and the
nation ratified the language Congress had drafted.73 Four
hundred thousand died for a noble cause, one of unassailable
importance even under modern human rights law. The figure
four hundred thousand is significant for one, perhaps, less
obvious reason as well. It is roughly the number of persons
transported from Africa to mainland British North America
and the United States-this country's share of the larger toll
of ten million survivors of the African slave trade to the
Americas over nearly four centuries, an "execrable commerce"
that cost many millions more lives in Africa and on the
Atlantic journeys to the principal New World slave societies
of Brazil, St. Dominique (now Haiti), and Jamaica.74
364,000. Over 281,000 more suffered what the Department of Veterans Affairs
classifies as non-mortal wounds during the Civil War. See Deptartment of
Defense, Principal Wars in which the United States Participated: U.S. Military
Serving and Casualties, http'/siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel]CASUALTY/
WCPRINCIPAL.pdf (last visted Apr. 27, 2010). Many of this number, including
amputees, doubtless died prematurely owing to the primitive state of medical
care and merciless economic realities during the late nineteenth century. The
eminent Civil War historian James McPherson estimates that at least fifteen
percent of those wounded during the Civil War later died as a result of injuries
sustained on the battlefield. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF
FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 347, 854 (1988).
72. See MCPHERSON, supra note 71, at 490-510.
73. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XIV. See generally ACKERMAN, supra
note 57, at 99-252; DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 353-481 (2d ed. 2005).
74. On the total numbers of victims of the Atlantic Slave Trade, and the
number of persons transported from Africa to British North America and the
United States see PHILIP D. CURTIN, THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: A CENSUS
268 (1969), HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC
SLAVE TRADE, 1440-1870, at 805 (1997), and DAVID ELTIS, THE RISE OF
AFRICAN SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS 208 (2000). The phrase "execrable
commerce" is Jefferson's, from the "original Rough draught" of the Declaration
of Independence. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 426 (Julian P. Boyd et
al. eds., 1950). Jefferson's charge that the "CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain.
determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought & sold.., has
prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or
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Perhaps, then, four hundred thousand Union dead represents
the first great step in expiating the guilt associated with the
forced transport of four hundred thousand Africans in the
slave trade to the United States, and certainly the sacrifice of
the Grand Army of the Republic was conceived in precisely
these terms at the time.75 In this light, I am prepared to
acknowledge a personal debt to that generation of 1861-1876,
utterly unlike the lesser debt owed to the generations of 1776
or 1789.
Accepting a special sense of duty to the Civil War dead
and the constitutional amendments they made possible need
not require conceding to Akhil Amar or Robert Cottrol that
the Fourteenth Amendment privatized the Second
Amendment right to arms.76 Evidence regarding the meaning
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 1868-while
certainly not clear, one-sided, or unambiguous-does admit of
a non-trivial claim that those voting to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to recognize a right to self-defense for
freed persons and for other Union sympathizers facing
terrorism and violence in the South. It bears emphasis,
however, that the suddenly fashionable claim for total
incorporation of a very privatistic Bill of Rights is much less
strong than some in the academy currently assume.77 The
restrict this execrable commerce" was struck before the Continental Congress
approved the Declaration. Id.
75. Lincoln's words from the Second Inaugural poignantly reprise the theme
of national sin, sacrifice, and redemption:
Fondly do we hope-fervently do we pray-that this mighty scourge of
war may speedily pass away .... Yet if God wills that it continue, until
all the wealth piled up by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of
unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with
the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said
three thousand years ago, so it must be said, "the judgments of the
Lord, are true and righteous altogether."
RICHARD J. CARWARDINE, LINCOLN 240-42 (2003); MCPHERSON, supra note 71,
at 844 (quoting and analyzing Lincoln's text).
76. See AIKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 262 (1998); Robert Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Public
Safety and the Right to Bear Arms, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN
AMERICA: REVISED AND EXPANDED 88-107 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W.
Ely, Jr. eds., 2d ed. 2008).
77. Apart from Amar who argues for "refined incorporation" of virtually the
entire Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment, AMAR, supra note 76,
at 215-30, prominent academics to advance a total incorporation model in
recent decades include Michael Kent Curtis and Richard L. Aynes, both of
whom challenged the then-dominant selective incorporation paradigm, which
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Thirty-Ninth Congress included forty-nine Senators and 183
Representatives during the debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment.78  Unlike the Annals of Congress containing
excerpts from the First Congress's debates on the Bill of
Rights, the Congressional Globe is complete and
comprehensive in its coverage of the debates on
Reconstruction. It is highly probative then that of the 232
members seated when the Fourteenth Amendment was under
discussion, only one Senator and five Representatives uttered
what can be construed as endorsements of a total
incorporation theory. 79 Advocates of total incorporation and
champions of a reconstructed, privatized right to arms
inevitably cite the speeches of John Bingham, a member of
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, and principal
spokesperson for the pending amendment in the House. 0 In
rested in part on the historical work of Raoul Berger and Charles Fairman cited
below. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Richard L. Aynes,
On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J.
57 (1994). As well as the older works by Fairman and Berger, Fourteenth
Amendment scholarship skeptical of Justice Black's total incorporation model
includes RONALD M. LABBE & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES:
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2003),
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988), Bret Boyce, Originalism and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 909 (1998), and George C.
Thomas III, The Riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor
Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627 (2007). Fairman and Berger's classic
critiques of incorporation are set out in Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1950), and Forrest McDonald, Forward to RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 157-66 (2d ed. 1997).
78. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-
2005, at 170-73 (2005) (listing all members of Congress by session and state).
Congress debated the Fourteenth Amendment intermittently from January 12,
1866, when John Bingham and Thaddeus Stevens introduced separate motions
in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction that formed the earliest drafts of the
future Amendment, until June 13, 1866, when the final version of the
Amendment was adopted by the House (the Senate had passed the Amendment
on June 8) and forwarded to the states for ratification. See 1 BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 187, 325
(1970). My numbers slightly undercount membership because I counted only
once seats occupied by more than one person during the period on account of
death or resignation. I did not count non-voting territorial delegates, of whom
there were nine in the House of Representatives.
79. See Thomas, supra note 77, at 1644.
80. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876, at 35, 63, 110, 121,
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particular, those favoring total incorporation rely on
Bingham's comments of February 28, 1866 when he said an
early version of the Fourteenth Amendment he introduced in
the House aimed to "secure to the citizens of each State all
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
in the several States."8' Earlier that day, in introducing the
new draft of the Amendment, Bingham stated with apparent
clarity "the proposition ... is simply.., to arm the Congress.
with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in
the constitution today. It hath that extent-no more."82
But this is hardly all Bingham said about the pending
Fourteenth Amendment. The deeper one delves into the
debates, the clearer it becomes that Charles Fairman and
Raoul Berger had good reason to characterize Bingham as a
haphazard and inconsistent thinker who frequently said one
thing only to retract it when pressed to elucidate his most
recent remarks.8 3 At times, Bingham happily endorsed the
view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended
to do no more than ensure non-discrimination and equal
access to whatever civil rights a particular state granted
white inhabitants, and it is anything but clear that he was
concerned with substantive rights, except insofar as he
wished to ensure that any substantive rights applied equally
in favor of all adult male citizens.84 He could not give a
principled and consistent answer regarding the impact of the
Fourteenth Amendment on state police powers, or explain
whether it created national police powers, how it affected
125-26, 131, 188 (1998); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second
Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309,
346 (1991).
81. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
82. Id. at 1088. Bingham proceeded to read the Amendment as it then
stood: "The Congress shall have the power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of the several States, and all
persons in the several States, equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property." Id. It is hardly obvious that Bingham's gloss of this language should
apply equally to the final version of Sections One and Five of the Amendment,
which uses different language and goes beyond the February formula to divest
the states of powers of rights abuse even as it vests the federal government with
new powers to secure the same rights that the states could no longer legally
violate.
83. See BERGER, supra note 77, at 160-65; Fairman, supra note 77, at 25-
26.
84. See NELSON, supra note 77, at 117-18; CONG. GLOBE, supra note 81, at
1094-95.
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women's rights, and whether it applied only in former
Confederate states or throughout the Union.8"
Citing Bingham does little to demonstrate the sense of
the House or of Congress; it does absolutely nothing to prove
the plain meaning of Privileges or Immunities at the time
they were voted into the Constitution by the people, for
despite constant prodding, Bingham proved unable to offer an
intelligible definition-whether plain or sophisticated-of
Privileges or Immunities. Indeed, on February 28, 1866,
shortly after introduction of the new draft of the Amendment,
an exchange between Bingham and the experienced lawyer
and legal academic Robert Hale, Republican of New York,
reached its denouement when Hale labeled Bingham's
peroration on natural law and that "justice which is the
highest duty of nations as it is the imperishable attribute of
the God of nations" a "calm, lucid, and logical vindication of
the amendment . . . [by] an able constitutional lawyer."8 6
Hale then proceeded to dismantle the inconsistencies and
incongruities in Bingham's emotive appeal in favor of his
early version of the Fourteenth Amendment, and mercilessly
abused Bingham for not being able to answer consistently
whether the amendment created a national police power.87
Hale's label "able constitutional lawyer" was, to borrow a
phrase from Chief Justice Marshall, "solemn mockery."88
Bingham did not get much clearer after the House took
up a revised proposal in the spring that ultimately ripened
into the familiar and still-contested text of the Fourteenth
Amendment's famous Section One. On May 10th, he offered
his final explanation of the amendment's meaning:
the words of the Constitution that "the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states" include, among other
privileges, the right to bear true allegiance to the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and to be
protected in life, liberty, and property. Next, sir, to the
allegiance which we all owe to God our Creator, is the
allegiance which we owe to our common country. 89
85. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 81, at 120.
86. Id. at 1094.
87. Id.
88. Id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
89. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 81, at 2542.
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Fuzzy as Bingham's sentiments may be from the standpoint
of those seeking interpretive guidance, they at least appear to
rule out incorporation of Sanford Levinson's insurrectionary
Second Amendment90 (and James Madison's Establishment
Clause 91 ). That, though, is probably the extent of the wisdom
they afford on the question of total incorporation.
As William Nelson has documented, anti-discrimination
was the dominant theme that arose during Congressional
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment. 92  The twentieth
century's obsessive attentiveness to the doctrinal limits of
procedural due process, substantive due process, equal
protection, and privileges or immunities was not
foreshadowed when the Fourteenth Amendment was under
consideration in Congress or by the ratifying public out of
doors. Sections Two through Four of the Fourteenth
Amendment-which imposed disabilities on former
Confederates who could not take the iron-clad oath,
diminished the representation of states that disenfranchised
on account of race, and disowned the Confederate debt-were
of cardinal importance from 1866-1868, even though they are
now of purely historical interest. When contemporary
legislators and voters turned their attention to the proposed
Section One, with its Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses, they were far more likely to
concern themselves with anti-subordination as an
overarching concept than with the specific contours of what
later became three separate branches of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, it was frequently
assumed that those concepts were nontechnical and
overlapping, rather than legalistic, rigid, and fully defined.
John Bingham was hardly the only member of Congress or of
the public unable to offer a completely theorized and
consistent account of the meanings of due process, privileges
or immunities, or equal protection. As Nelson argues, the
narrow-but by no means untenable or even surprising-
90. The argument that the Second Amendment protects a right to use force
against an oppressive government was famously argued in Sanford Levinson,
The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1990). For a critique
of the insurrectionary theory, see UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 42, at 170-78.
91. On the importance of disestablishmentarianism to Madison and
Madison's thinking regarding the First Amendment, see LABUNSKI, supra note
39, at 223-24.
92. See NELSON, supra note 77, at 71-80.
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reading the Supreme Court gave Privileges and Immunities
in The Slaughterhouse Cases initiated a long historical
process in which the different components of Section One
acquired distinct meanings through judicial interpretation. 93
As long as Congress remained committed to Reconstruction,
its focus was as much on federal legislative remedies for
Southern misdeeds as it was on judicially enforced
disabilities. And after Reconstruction ended, it was many
years before the Supreme Court's shift in focus from economic
to non-economic liberties accelerated the evolution of
doctrinally distinct branches of Fourteenth Amendment law.
The Slaughterhouse Cases,94 and even the classic Harlan
dissents of the late nineteenth century, 95 appear to assume a
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment working in tandem
for general anti-subordination purposes rather than the
constitutionalization of particular limits on legislative
authority when applied with an even hand.
Michael Kent Curtis, 96 Richard Aynes, 97 and others have
doubtless succeeded in unsettling a once orthodox
understanding that Justice Black 98 lacked any academically
credible case for total incorporation. Yet three particular
points Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger relied on in
rejecting Black's total incorporation theory remain very
difficult for champions of incorporation to counter. If the
Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the Bill of
Rights:
a. Why did no member of either House object to the
Blaine Amendment that would have prohibited state
taxes to support religious schools on grounds of
redundancy (seeing as, under the incorporation
theory, the First Amendment Establishment Clause
would have already applied against the states)?99
93. Id. at 155-74.
94. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); see also NELSON, supra
note 77, at 156-74.
95. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 33 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
96. See CURTIS, supra note 77.
97. See Aynes, supra note 77.
98. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
99. See Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 464 (1981).
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b. Why were there no objections on incorporation
grounds against the many Reconstruction Era state
decisions to replace grand jury indictment with
presentment?100
c. And why did Congress ratify several constitutions
submitted by southern states seeking readmission
that did not contain all the guarantees of the federal
Bill of Rights?''
Aynes concedes that these are (at least superficially)
hard charges for the incorporationists to answer, but suggests
that the contradiction between incorporation and toleration of
state violations of the Federal Bill of Rights would not have
been readily apparent during the 1860s and 1870s because
most people were not thinking in terms of federal judicial
enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states, and those
that were did not know the contents of state law.0 2 Aynes's
answer was, perhaps, more satisfactory when he first made it
nearly twenty years ago, when the dominant paradigm of
originalism still focused on the intent of the framers. After
all, a secret intent might be an intent all the same, even if it
remained a mystery to the public at large. But in this age of
Scalia-esque original public understanding, the failure of the
general public to appreciate John Bingham's alleged
incorporationist intent is telling indeed. If the people out of
doors did not know about incorporation and its intended
impact on the laws of their states, how could they have
understood that their support for ratification amounted to
endorsement of the mysterious doctrine?
Even admitting total incorporation (something I am not
inclined to do) leaves the question of whether the allegedly
incorporated right to arms was understood to vest in
individuals in their private capacity, or as members of the
militia. Those who stress the former underestimate the
importance of black and integrated militia to supporters of
Reconstruction who voted in favor of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The militia, understood in pointedly civic
terms, had not wholly morphed (as Akhil Amar maintains 10 3)
into the Ku Klux Klan or like organs of terror by the time the
100. See Fairman, supra note 77, at 82-85, 97-99, 101, 103-06, 111.
101. See id. at 126-32.
102. See Aynes, supra note 77, at 94-96.
103. AMAR, supra note 76, at 257-67.
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The volunteers who
comprised the Union Army and the citizens (black and white)
who served in the militia units of Reconstruction
governments in the South have far stronger militia
credentials under terms of the 1792 Militia Act (still on the
books in 1866-1868) than the masked night riders who
rallied for the outlaw cause of violent restoration of a system
of racial subordination. Legal academics and the general
public have lost sight of the extent to which the collapse of
Reconstruction was a consequence not simply of violence, but
of the defeat of black and integrated militia loyal to the
Republican Party and Reconstruction by extralegal white
militia loyal to the Democratic Party and Redemption. 104 The
failure of Reconstruction was not (as Woodrow Wilson, Ulrich
Bonnell Philips, or William Dunning would have it) that it
was tried at all, or-as Robert Cottrol or Stephen Halbrook
would have it-that it was too statist and insufficiently
libertarian. 10 5  If the federal government had succeeded in
preserving the ability of black persons and others loyal to
Republican governors to bear arms in the lawfully constituted
state militia established by Reconstruction governments,
Reconstruction might have endured. Likewise, an integrated
police force in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries could have altered the face of Jim Crow, or perhaps
precluded it altogether.. 0 6
We cannot know the contours of the history that never
was. But speaking in the spirit of the hypothetical past
104. See STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL
STRUGGLES IN THE RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION
265-313 (2003); OTIS A. SINGLETARY, NEGRO MILITIA AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1957).
105. Cf Robert J. Cottrol, Introduction to GUN CONTROL AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT
(Robert J. Cottrol ed., 1994); 22 WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, THE AMERICAN
NATION: A HISTORY (1907); HALBROOK, supra note 80; ULRICH BONNELL
PHILLIPS, LIFE AND LABOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (1929); Woodrow Wilson, The
Reconstruction of the Southern States, 87 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 1 (1901).
106. The thesis that Reconstruction's "failure" is that it was not pursued long
eno'ugh and hard enough by the federal government was famously advanced by
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877 (1988). To whatever extent it may be fair to characterize Reconstruction
as a failure rather than a partial success, it is perhaps worth noting that the
unquestionably successful reconstructions of Germany and Japan after World
War II did not pursue a libertarian course, or rely on private arms to stave off a
violent resurgence of the old order and its oppressive ways.
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invoked by Amar, Halbrook, and Cottrol, I am skeptical that
the counterfactual narrative they prefer would have played
itself out in quite the halcyon manner they suppose, had their
chosen parameters actually held sway. The ability of
individual black persons to arm themselves in a private
capacity may have facilitated the defeat or intimidation of the
Klan, but it could also have led to a ratcheting up of violence
and the coming of a prolonged and highly destructive race
war. The perceived likelihood of either scenario depends in
large part on ones faith in the deterrent effect of guns
balanced against their potential to bring catastrophic harm in
the hands of the passionate, the hateful, or the frightened.
On those questions, my inclinations are rather different than
the ones John Lott brings to bear in his controversial analysis
of public safety in our own times. 10 7 In the debates over the
relationship between access to guns and the level of crime,
some rely on manipulated figures, others on articles of faith,
and some few on solid research and reasoning, but there is no
shortage of authorities for either of the mutually exclusive
propositions that more guns mean less crime or that more
guns mean more death. When it comes to restoring the
original understanding of the right to arms during
Reconstruction, both camps appear to project backwards into
a remade and altered historical landscape their favored
visionsof the present.
One telling objection to the preferred gun rights vision of
a rewritten post-bellum past focuses on the practical
unenforceability of any legal right in favor of African-
Americans in the old New South that actually existed. Since
post-Reconstruction, judicial enforcement of non-economic
individual liberties-particularly enforcement in favor of
socially disadvantaged groups-did not return to the United
States until the 1930s at the earliest, it is not clear what a
reconstructed private right to arms could have done for
individuals confronting redeemed state governments and
white power apparatuses bent on ensuring subordination.
The subtext for Halbrook, Cottrol, and company, I suppose, is
ultimately not that courts would have protected black access
to arms had the Privileges and Immunities Clause been
107. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING
CRIME AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000).
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properly enforced to incorporate a private right to guns, but
that death in a gun fight is better than subjugation. Cottrol
and Halbrook's vision was rejected by black America in the
1870s: confronted with the reality of the end of
Reconstruction, millions of black southerners opted for
accommodation rather than race-based civil war.108 Their
grandchildren and great-grandchildren lived to see the end of
second-class citizenship and the coming of formal equality.
Perhaps the accomodationist option was less heroic than that
favored by the National Rifle Association (and in this and any
other context, the supposition that the NRA cares deeply for
the welfare of black America is rather difficult to swallow), 10 9
but in the longer term, the strategy of accommodation
attained results that are arguably more desirable than race
war to the point of extirpation.
The Second Amendment, as originally understood, is a
poor basis for recognizing a private right to weapons
possession. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of 1868 is a
more plausible alternative, but one not dictated by original
understanding or history. That said, there may well be
several viable avenues towards legitimizing judicial
intervention to veto legislation or executive action adversely
impacting the putative right of individuals to own guns for
purposes of private self-defense. These might include popular
constitutionalism, the Ninth Amendment, substantive due
process, living privileges and immunities as opposed to
privileges or immunities frozen in time, or privatistic and
defense emanations from various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, including the Second Amendment. And perhaps some
of these theories more accurately explain the result (if not the
opinion) in Heller and the likely result in McDonald than
Justice Scalia's theory of original meaning. I have much
sympathy for popular constitutionalism, but at least on the
national level, it is not entirely clear what function popular
constitutionalism really serves. Legislative choices cannot
108. On the non-violent (but far from passive and acquiescent) settlement
that black southerners negotiated with the re-emergent white power structure
at the end of Reconstruction, see FONER, supra note 106, at 281-91, HAHN,
supra note 104, at 312-13, and LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG:
THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY, 525, 529-32, 537-38 (1980).




long be out of sync with popular constitutional values without
the electoral and legislative processes bringing the two back
into harmony, leaving little work for judges who might
otherwise be inclined to invalidate legislation that does not
square with the nation's constitutional sensibilities. On the
local or regional legislative level, the question with respect to
popular constitutionalism is whether national norms should
trump local variations. The new democratic experimentalists,
as well as Louis Brandeis, might answer not to the extent
local experimentation is snuffed out, but rights enthusiasts of
any particular stripe would retort: experiment with anything
you like;just not our rights.
The American people as a whole feel that there is a right
to own guns, and that this right applies against the states.
I am confident the Court will not disappoint them. My
hope is that it preserves a wide swath for local regulatory
options, including substantial restrictions. Brandeis's
experimentalism appeals to me." 1  If Stephen Halbrook
wants to live in a society with easy access to guns, and I want
to live in one where access to guns is controlled, with fifty-one
principal jurisdictions and innumerable municipalities and
counties with independent legislative authority in the United
States, there should be room for each of us. Of course, many
gun enthusiasts, Mr. Halbrook among them, will say D.C.'s
draconian solution was wrongheaded. After all, D.C.-with
the toughest gun laws in the country-also has often had the
highest murder rate in the country.' But Hawaii has the
lowest murder rate, and it also has tough laws." 2 New York
City has strong gun control laws and a moderate murder rate
by American standards, lower than that of many less
110. As Justice Brandeis famously remarked: "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). Brandeis's insight helps inform the
contemporary movement for democratic experimentalism, which favors pursuit
of multiple market and regulatory approaches to social and economic problems
with a view to fostering the emergence of past practice solutions. See generally
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Expermentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 431 (1998).
111. See The Disaster Center, United States Crime Rates 1960-2008,
httpJ/www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm.
112. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States by
State 2007, http'/www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_05.html.
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populous states. 113  Japan, England, and Northern Ireland
have very few guns at all, and lower murder rates than any
American jurisdiction. 1 4  Germany and France have many
guns, but lots of restrictions, and lower murder rates than
any American jurisdiction."5  There seem to me many
rational choices democratic legislatures could make. Let
them make them.
What concerns me more is projection," 6 that is, the
desire of some in gun culture states to impose their values of
easy access and wide ownership on people living in states
that have opted for tighter controls. In a somewhat
unorthodox maneuver in 2009, gun rights enthusiasts in the
House of Representatives tried to attach-as a rider on
unrelated legislation-a Congressional statement proclaiming
that the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause
protected the ability of anyone who carried a licensed firearm
in any state to carry that weapon in any other state, local
laws notwithstanding." 7 The legislative gambit failed, but
gun rights enthusiasts, including Alan Gura, lead counsel in
Heller and McDonald, are eagerly pursuing a judicial
alternative. Historically, the beauty of Brandeis-style
experimentation in the pluralistic federal republic has been
that people are free to move to states where the regulatory
regime harmonizes with their preferences. But one litigious
person being able to impose the value system of one
113. See id.
114. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TENTH UNITED
NATIONS SURVEY OF CRIME TRENDS AND OPERATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS, COVERING THE PERIOD 2005--2006, at 28, 58 (Dec. 19, 2008)
[hereinafter UNITED NATIONS OFFICE], available at http://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf; World Health
Organization, Numbers and Rates of Registered Deaths 2006,
http'J/apps.who.int/whosis/database/mort/table1.cfi (follow the "Japan"
hyperlink; then follow the "2006" hyperlink).
115. See id. at 32; World Health Organization, supra note 114.
116. Justice Cardozo famously employed this term in Baldwin v. G.AF.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935), in the context of New York's attempt to
project its authority across state lines by dictating the price of milk to Vermont
producers who dealt with New York dealers.
117. See Bernie Becker & David M. Herszenhorn, Gun Rights Expansion
Fails in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at A18, available at
httpJ/www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/politics/23guns.html?_r=l&scp=3&sq=th
une%20concealed%20carry%20amendment&st=cse; Paul Kane, Senate





community on another by relocating is a different matter.
For those who value easy access to guns, residency in or
relocation to an easy access state is the natural and time
honored solution. Asking Justice Scalia to mandate easy
access on persons living in jurisdictions where the majority
favors tight control is a wholly distinct and thoroughly anti-
democratic approach. It begs a result neither dictated by
terms of the Second Amendment nor required by the
language of the Fourteenth, in either the Due Process or
Privileges or Immunities Clauses. It is, in essence,
dictatorship by the officious libertarian intermeddler.
Pundits and prognosticators-Cass Sunstein, Mark
Tushnet, and Lary Slolum among them-have labeled the
Heller decision minimalistic, indeed quintessentially
minimalistic, in keeping with what some describe as the
Roberts Court's commitment to moderation. 118 These
characterizations of Heller invest much capital in Justice
Scalia's disclaimer in favor of presumptively valid classes of
gun restrictions, allegedly not called into question by the
Heller holding. But was Heller, at its core, really
minimalistic? And is the McDonald decision likely to be
similarly minimalistic in its implications? There is ample
reason to fear not, as illustrated by the claims of prominent
gun rights advocates Alan Gura, Don B. Kates, Stephen
Halbrook, Nelson Lund, and David Kopel. 119 As several of
these commentators point out, Justice Scalia did not do a
particularly good job of explaining how the presumptively
valid forms of gun restriction he appeared to endorse in
Heller square with his more general pronouncement that the
Second Amendment, as originally understood, protects a
private right to carry weapons for purposes of confrontation.
118. See supra notes 3 & 4.
119. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-
1521 (Nov. 16, 2009) (urging that most state gun control legislation violated the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as well as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Brief for Respondents the National Rifle Association
of America, Inc. et. al. in support of Petitioners, McDonald v. City of Chicago,
No. 08-1521 (Nov. 16, 2009); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and
Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1343 (2009) (urging that Heller
conceded too much to the regulators and that the original understanding of the
Second Amendment permits virtually no regulation); David B. Kopel, Amicus
Brief in McDonald v. Chicago: On Behalf of the International Law Enforcement
Educators and Trainers Association, et al., U. DENV. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER
(Nov. 22, 2009), httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=1511425.
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To the extent that conflicts arise between his dicta in favor of
presumptively valid restrictions and his grand theory in favor
of gun rights, it is presumably the restrictions that will be
required to yield. Both in terms of preferred policies and
perceptions of constitutional dictates, the claims of the hard-
core gun champions named above are radical and absolutistic,
and the cadre remains committed to litigating until the
Supreme Court announces an iron clad rule that they deem
truly worthy of celebration.
Little if any legislation-with the possible exception of
prohibitions against gun possession by convicted felons-
would likely stand if the Court embraced the positions
favored by the NRA's chosen band of advocates in McDonald.
Once the slave power conspiracy won what ultimately proved
its greatest victory in Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 ° and the
Supreme Court announced that the federal government
lacked the power to restrict slavery in federal enclaves,
moderates like Abraham Lincoln immediately suspected that
a second Dred Scott decision was in the offing, and that the
Supreme Court harbored designs of currying further favor
with the slave power by announcing that the states
themselves (including progressive enclaves like Wisconsin
and Massachusetts) lacked the capacity to interfere with the
rights of slave owners to bring their human property where
they would, including to communities inimically opposed to
slavery.'12  The notion that the black man had no rights the
white man need respect threatened to expand into the
proposition that the black man had no rights any white men
or communities could respect, even if they wished. This
spring, the nation may well stand on the threshold of another
second Dred Scott decision, which is to say it faces a bolder
and more expansive Heller decision, holding that no
community has any rights the gun wielding libertarian need
120. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
121. The most insightful and damning historical account of the slave power
conspiracy as architect of secession is 2 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO
DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS TRIUMPHANT: 1854-1861 (2007). The locus classicus
for Lincoln's anticipation of a second Dred Scott decision announcing that states
lacked the power to prohibit slavery within their own territories are the debates
with Douglas, particularly the fifth debate at Knox College in Galesburg on
October 7, 1858. On the northern public's reaction to Dred Scott, see generally
MCPHERSON, supra note 71, at 176-81, and DAVID M. POTrER, THE IMPENDING
CRISIS: 1848-1861, at 267-96 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976).
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heed. If Alan Gura gets all he wants from the high court, a
five-justice majority will announce precisely this doctrine on
the last day of the term in June.
Alan Gura's view, however, is by no means the most
radical gun rights view harbored by mainstream, influential
thinkers in the gun power conspiracy. In my capacity as a
skeptical outsider to the gun rights movement, the most
startling testimony regarding the unlimited right to arms I
have heard was uttered by Sandra Froman, one time Chief
Counsel and President of the NRA, speaking a mere fifteen
miles from NRA headquarters in that sanctum sanctorum of
the recast and reanimated Second Amendment, George
Mason University School of Law in Arlington, Virginia.'22 On
October 17, 2007, when Heller was docketed, but not yet
argued in the Supreme Court, I was among the featured
speakers at a Second Amendment conference at Mason, home
to some of the loudest and proudest NRA spokespersons in
the legal academy.123 During the late afternoon panel
discussion, a question (perhaps rhetorical) was raised
concerning how many persons gathered in the lecture theatre
would feel safer if every person in the arena were armed.
One member of the audience (I believe David Kopel, perhaps
scheduled to appear on a panel later that evening)
immediately raised his hand to volunteer an affirmative
answer. But it was another member of the audience, soon
identified as Sandra Froman, who offered the most elaborate
122. For a biographical sketch of Froman, see Kevin Cool, Top Gun, STAN.
MAG., MarJApr. 2006, http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2006/
marapr/features/froman.html.
123. See William Merkel, Remarks at the George Mason University Civil
Rights Law Journal Symposium: The Second Amendment and Twenty-First
Century Jurisprudence (Oct. 17, 2007). The transcript can be viewed at the
George Mason University website. George Mason University Civil Rights Law
Journal, Symposium 2007, http://www.law.gmu.edu/gmucrlj/symposium-
2007.php. It would be difficult to conceive of an institution more closely wedded
to gun rights than George Mason Law School. The NRA itself endowed the
grotesquely named Patrick Henry Professorship of Constitutional Law and the
Second Amendment held by Professor Nelson Lund, and Robert Levy, a George
Mason alumnus who was the leading mover behind the Heller case, has
twice made million dollar gifts to his alma matter. See NRA Endows Chair at
George Mason U. Law School, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 14, 2003,
httpJ/chronicle.com/article/NRA-Endows-Chair-at-George-/19835; George Mason
Law School Receives a Gift of $1 Million from Robert A Levy, GEO. MASON U.
SCH. L., June 24, 2006, http'//www.law.gmu.edu/news/2006/473; see also John
Gibeaut, A Shot at the Second Amendment, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2007, at 50.
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response. There seemed to be an implicit sense in the room
that the individual members of an armed populace would
need some sort of queue to know precisely when to intervene
with lethal force to forestall a crazed, violent person doing
something drastic, and in the aftermath of Virginia Tech, all
sensed that on academic premises this matter was of
immediate, pragmatic import. Before anyone could formulate
this question concretely, Froman was ready with the
announcement that though she no longer spoke for the NRA,
she was certain a pamphlet and an educational program
could be made available to teach right-thinking people the
signs to look for among those with itchy triggers, so that good
citizens would be prepared to intervene preemptively before
the violence prone should choose to shoot. For the right-
leaning, Froman anticipated the best of all possible worlds: a
universally armed community living pursuant to a privatized
Bush Doctrine, in which the decent folk would know not only
that they should and could shoot first, but precisely when it
was most appropriate. Froman did not descend into
particulars at the time, but those with active imaginations
could doubtless quickly conjure some of the characteristics
and criteria that would make a person more like Iran than
Britain on the scale of preemption worthy dangerousness. 124
President Froman's invitation to regress into the
Hobbesian state of nature actually attempts to bring about
one of the outcomes that the Fourteenth Amendment-and
the Civil Rights Act for which it provided permanent
constitutional footing-aimed to preclude. The right of a
citizen to governmental protection, and the duty of citizens to
124. The controversial Bush Doctrine was announced as the National
Security Strategy of the United States of America in September 2002. As the
White House explained:
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The
greater the threat, the great is the risk of inaction-and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
even if the uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemies
attack.
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 293 (2d
ed. 2009). The Bush Doctrine served as a principal internal justification in the
administration's choice to attack Iraq in 2003 and as the basis for failed efforts
to rally domestic and international support for preemptive strikes against Iran.
See W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the
Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INVL L. 525 (2006).
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show allegiance to the government that affords them such
protection, were bedrock principles asserted by members of
the Thirty-Ninth Congress during debates on the Civil Rights
Act and the constitutional amendment that it spawned.
121
Those members spanned the entire political spectrum of
persons loyal to the Union. The reciprocal individual right to
protection and governmental duty to protect were founded on
natural law, and in their domestic dimensions had clear
analogues and parallels to the international law concept of
diplomatic protection enabling and binding states to protect
the rights of their citizens against violation by foreign
sovereigns. 126  Democratic Senator Reverdy Johnson of
Maryland, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois (multiple and
changing party affiliations), Republican U.S. Representative
John Marshall Broomall of Pennsylvania, Republican
Representative Samuel Shellaberger of Ohio, Republican
Representative James Wilson of Iowa, and Republican U.S
Representative Martin Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania all
made clear during debates on the Civil Rights Act that the
reciprocal concepts of protection and duty were central to the
constitutional compact and central to citizenship. Indeed,
Hobbes himself had famously made the same point after the
English Civil War, urging disenchanted royalists to make
their peace with the Republican government as he himself
had done precisely because it offered tranquility and
stability. 127 Hobbes was no fan of the state of nature, and
having lived through a long succession of brutal wars in
England and on the continent, he preferred peace to
anarchy. 128  Two centuries later, Lyman Trumbull's vision
was even less equivocal:
How is it that every person born in these United States
owes allegiance to the Government? Everything the he is
or had, his property and his life, may be taken by the
Government of the United States in its defense . . . and
can it be that.., we have got a Government which is all-
125. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 73, at 423-54.
126. On diplomatic protection, see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
143-44, 231-32, 366-68 (2d ed. 2005).
127. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 147-48, 469-70 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed.,
1996). On the political context in which Hobbes appealed to royalists to avow
allegiance to the Commonwealth, see QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND
REPUBLICAN LIBERTY 178-82, 198-208 (2008).
128. See SKINNER, supra note 127, at 178-82, 198-208.
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powerful to command the obedience of a citizen, but has
no power to afford him protection? Is that all this boasted
American citizenship amounts to? . . . Sir, it cannot be.
Such is not the meaning of our Constitution. Such is not
the meaning of American citizenship. The Government,
which would go to war to protect its meanest-I will not
say citizen-inhabitant . . . in any foreign land whose
rights were unjustly encroached upon, has certainly some
power to protect its own citizens in their own country.
Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights. 129
Trumbull makes patent what is so enticing to Froman:
the claim that the government cannot protect me is in fact a
claim that I have no duty to the government. In this light,
Froman's violence-inflected vision of the good life is perhaps
not all that surprising. The psycho-drama of allegiance
renounced generally simmers not far below the smooth
surface of the gun rights movement's rhetorical invocations of
the spirit of'76.
IV. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the craziness of the radical gun rights
preference for private violence over public security, Second
Amendment enthusiasts are in the majority in the country,
perhaps even in a super-majority. Why do they fear the
democratic process and local outcomes that do not ape their
preferences? Why do they, like the slave-power conspirators
of old, demand constitutional protection for anti-social
behavior that is under no threat from national popular
majorities? Why do they demand, like the slave-power
conspirators of old, that dissent from their absolutistic vision
be read out of the constitutional compact? Why do they insist
on perpetualism and absolutism when it comes to the right to
guns? Why does the Froman vision have appeal, and why has
the NRA-which in theory does not object to enforcement of
existing reasonable regulations-never encountered a
regulation that its members accept as reasonable?
I can think of at least two answers, each of which is more
than a little troubling. One explanation for the gun
community's absolutist approach is captured best in Stephen
Halbrook's mono-causal and mono-maniacal The Founder's
129. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 81, at 1757.
[Vol:501258
HELLER AS HUBRIS
Second Amendment: The Origins of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms, in which the author sets out his secular case that
a private right to gun possession is the summa bona of
American Revolutionary eschatology. 130 For Halbrook, the
Revolutionary War was fought to vindicate the right to arms.
The revolutionaries prevailed without mention of foreign or
professional assistance because of that celebrated right to
arms, and then the Constitution was authored to vindicate
the right to arms that had been won by the Revolution.
Later, the Bill of Rights, with its capstone Second
Amendment, was added to remove threats to the right to
arms that the Constitution created. There are other, lesser
elements to the Bill of Rights, and they merit some mention.
First Amendment freedoms, for instance, have a certain
utility, because they secure the right to discuss the right to
arms. (Halbrook stops short of mentioning the right to
worship guns free of governmental interference.) Likewise,
the Fourth Amendment doubly protects the right to arms
against unreasonable search and seizure. And the Sixth
Amendment ensures that one can have counsel in federal
court to vindicate the right to arms. In sum, guns cease in
Halbrook's analysis to be tools, but become the end all and be
all of earthly existence. In a near inversion of Immanuel
Kant's celebrated categorical imperative that no person is a
mere means to a greater end, people and constitutionalism in
Halbrook's account threaten to become bare instruments to
protect guns. 131
A second rather more disturbing and impious answer to
the question of why the NRA has launched the most
absolutistic, driven, paranoid, and obsessive campaign to
warp the constitutional compact since the days of the slave
power sounds in terms of false religion, ancestor worship, and
idolatry. Under the gun enthusiast's post-modem version of
covenant theology, the Founding Fathers (with Constitution-
hater Patrick Henry taking front and center, and
Constitution-drafter James Madison fading into the
distance) 132 were a prophetic and indeed sainted generation,
130. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS' SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS
OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (2008).
131. See William G. Merkel, 114 AM. HIST. REv. 1074 (2009) (reviewing
HALBROOK, supra note 130).
132. On Patrick Henry's intense but unsuccessful campaign to sabotage the
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who received a divine dispensation to cherish, worship, and
employ the gun in pursuit of a heightened state of libertarian
piety, from which later lesser generations have tragically
fallen away. As in the Old Testament's cycles of declension-
during which the people of God took to serving Baal and
lesser false foreign gods in between times of prophetic
revelation and reaffirmation of God's Covenant with Israel-
the people of America have taken to serving liberalism,
statism, socialism, and lesser non-gun related rights in these
late degenerate times. The mission of the gun rights
movement is to restore the nation to its true foundations, and
to cast off the blasphemous and faddish perversions of the
Warren, Burger, and insufficiently righteous Rehnquist
Courts in favor of true gun-focused and godly principles. This
sacred duty commands obedience; in the eyes of the true
believers, that obedience is a consequence of historical fidelity
and Christian faith. Indeed, in the eyes of the most ardent
believers, restoration of the lost gun-centered Constitution
comes close to being a necessary precondition for the Rapture.
Sadly for the rest of us, these modern day Pharisees are quite
blind to the absurdity of their fervent vision for which neither
Holy Scripture, late-eighteenth-century political thought, or
Reconstruction Era politics provide firm support. 133
More sadly still, barring unforeseen and nearly
unforeseeable momentary spasms of insight among one of the
five members of the Heller majority, the United States may
well stand mere weeks away from a judicial fiat endorsing a
new constitutional dispensation of universal and unfettered
access to arms utterly unlike any secular or pious
Constitution and prevent its ratification see LABUNSKI, supra note 39, at 27-28.
133. I was somewhat surprised to learn that the editors of the Santa Clara
Law Review read this paragraph as an unwarranted attack on Christianity.
The author is a moderate Episcopalian, with a fondness for traditional liturgy
and progressive sermonizing. Rather than casting aspersions on believers, I
intended to draw an implicit contrast between the pacific message of the
Beatitudes and the violence inflected secular rhetoric of the contemporary
American right. That rhetoric frequently elides untenable originalist
assumptions about American history with idolatrous ancestor worship and often
takes on Christian cadences and pretends to make a Christian appeal. To point
out these characteristics of one of the dominant tropes of our times is hardly to
disparage Christian beliefs. My argument was developed in more detail in
William G. Merkel, A Cultural Turn: Reflections on Recent Historical and Legal
Writing on the Second Amendment, 17 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 671, 696-98
(2006).
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understanding that animated the national mainstream
during the age of independence or during that most Godly
epoch of anti-slavery and national constitutional regeneration
that produced the Fourteenth Amendment. The nation lives
in troubled times, and the triumph of the constitutional freak
show looms near at hand. May it prove as fleeting as the
slave power conspiracy's ascendancy after Dred Scott, and
may its demise come much more gently and with precious
little loss of life.

